Top 10 sigsac.org Competitors

ieee-security.org

Home page for IEEE TC on Security and Privacy

chi2026.acm.org

This FAQ aims to help the CHI community understand the new format and changes to the CHI 2026 Technical Program. As announced on our Blog, the conference is introducing significant updates to its submission process and presentation formats. This FAQ provides concise answers to common questions from authors, reviewers, and attendees to support a smooth […]

sec-deadlines.github.io

countdowns to top security and privacy conference deadlines.

dl.acm.org

acm digital library home page

arxiv.org

A system of non-tradable credits that flow between individuals like karma, hence proposed under that name, is a mechanism for repeated resource allocation that comes with attractive efficiency and fairness properties, in theory. In this study, we test karma in an online experiment in which human subjects repeatedly compete for a resource with time-varying and stochastic individual preferences or urgency to acquire the resource. We confirm that karma has significant and sustained welfare benefits even in a population with no prior training. We identify mechanism usage in contexts with sporadic high urgency, more so than with frequent moderate urgency, and implemented as a simple (binary) karma bidding scheme as particularly effective for welfare improvements: relatively larger aggregate efficiency gains are realized that are (almost) Pareto superior. These findings provide guidance for further testing and for future implementation plans of such mechanisms in the real world.

scholar.google.com

google scholar provides a simple way to broadly search for scholarly literature. search across a wide variety of disciplines and sources: articles, theses, books, abstracts and court opinions.