10 principais zh.1lib.sk concorrentes

zh.annas-archive.org

世界上最大的开源、开放数据图书馆。不仅是 sci-hub, library genesis, z-library 等站的镜像。

zh.annas-archive.se

安娜的档案已成为世界上最大的影子库，这要求我们对发布进行标准化。

zh.annas-archive.li

世界上最大的开源、开放数据图书馆。不仅是 sci-hub, library genesis, z-library 等站的镜像。

book.douban.com

午夜与太阳——让书籍的光与暖，炽热我们的心灵

arxiv.org

A system of non-tradable credits that flow between individuals like karma, hence proposed under that name, is a mechanism for repeated resource allocation that comes with attractive efficiency and fairness properties, in theory. In this study, we test karma in an online experiment in which human subjects repeatedly compete for a resource with time-varying and stochastic individual preferences or urgency to acquire the resource. We confirm that karma has significant and sustained welfare benefits even in a population with no prior training. We identify mechanism usage in contexts with sporadic high urgency, more so than with frequent moderate urgency, and implemented as a simple (binary) karma bidding scheme as particularly effective for welfare improvements: relatively larger aggregate efficiency gains are realized that are (almost) Pareto superior. These findings provide guidance for further testing and for future implementation plans of such mechanisms in the real world.